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Mary Dawson, Commissioner,
Office of the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner
Parliament of Canada
Centre Block, P.O. Box 16
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0A6
November 27, 2016
Dear Commissioner Dawson,
OSGOODE HALL
LAW SCHOOL
4700 Keele St.
Toronto ON
Canada M3J 1P3
Tel 416 736 5030
Fax 416 736 5736
www.osgoode.yorku.ca

RE: Concerns and Information about a Ministerial Conflict of Interest –
The Honourable Harjit Sajjan
I am writing to ask you to examine and rule on whether the Minister of National
Defence, the Honourable Harjit Sajjan, has breached section 6(1) of the Conflict
of Interest Act by virtue of being the Minister to decide whether to call a
commission of inquiry in response to House of Commons E-petition E-70
(transfer of detainees in Afghanistan) despite a conflict of interest, rather than
recusing himself as required by section 21 of the Act. I am writing in relation to
your power under section 45(1) to examine a matter on your own initiative
when you have “reason to believe” the Act has been contravened. This letter is
thus a combined letter of information and letter of concern that is intended to
provide the “reason to believe” that triggers section 45(1).
Please note that I am writing in my capacity as a private citizen and also in a
more specific capacity as a professor of law with a special interest in the rule of
law and public accountability in relation to both the operation of our
parliamentary democracy and the operation of the executive state in areas that
are currently subject to very little oversight or review. I should also declare that
I was previously the Member of Parliament for Toronto-Danforth (Match 2012
– October 2015), during which period I spent considerable time on the question
of accountability in relation to the Afghan detainee issue; however, this letter is
in no way a partisan submission.
By way of initial overview, it is my sincere and considered belief that Minister
Sajjan is very likely in possession of information dating back to his time when
he was in the Canadian Armed Forces that would almost certainly be of great
relevance to any commission of inquiry. This places him in a conflict of
interest because of his personal interest (“private interest”, per section 4 of the
Act -- “intérêt personnel” in the French text) in avoiding being put in the
awkward position of being required to testify about his pre-ministerial
knowledge in a way that could negatively affect perceptions of the conduct of
the ministry he now leads. In addition, it is possible that, given Minister Sajjan’s
military-intelligence liaison role in Afghanistan prior to being elected to the
House of Commons, a commission of inquiry could also touch on his own role
as a military-intelligence liaison in ways that he would prefer not be made
public; here, I emphasize that I am not talking about any role by the Minister in
decisions that lead to torture (for I take the Minister at his word that he was not
involved in the decisions to transfer detainees) but about the nature and extent
of his overall role that requires him to have close and congenial contact with
persons who may turn out to be amongst those responsible for torture in
Afghanistan.

In short, a reasonable observer would, in my view, conclude that it is in the
personal interest of the Minister – again, the “private interest” / “intérêt
personnel”, to use the language of the Conflict of Interest Act – not to have to
testify at any commission of inquiry concerning the treatment of detainees
during periods when he served in Afghanistan. As such, he is in a conflict of
interest by virtue of being the Minister to decide whether there will be a
commission of inquiry in the first place.
Before continuing, allow me to emphasize that none of what I have said or will
say in this letter, and none of what I have said before or in future on this matter,
is meant to cast any aspersions on Minister Sajjan’s service in the military. On
the contrary, I have every reason to believe he served honourably, bravely and
effectively – and this may be an understatement. I also have no reason to
believe Minister Sajjan was part of the decision chain surrounding whether or
not detainees would be transferred to the risk of torture. However, the
foregoing is irrelevant to whether or not Minister Sajjan could reasonably be
expected to be called before a commission of inquiry to testify about aspects of
his knowledge relevant to what others may have known about the fate that
awaited any transferred detainees.
Allow me now to set out the substance of my concerns alongside some basic
supporting information. I will do so using numbered paragraphs for ease of
future reference:
1. E-petition E-70 called upon / requested the government to establish a
commission of inquiry into various aspects surrounding the policy and
practices related to Canada’s transfer of detained or otherwise captured
persons to agencies of the government of Afghanistan. It acquired the
requisite number of signatures to trigger an obligation on the
government to issue a written response, which it did on June 16, 2016.
Both E-70 and a PDF of the government response can be found at the
following House of Commons URL:
https://petitions.parl.gc.ca/en/Petition/Details?Petition=e-70 I also
attach a copy of each.

2. The government response was written and delivered on behalf of the
government by the Honourable Harjit Sajjan, the Minister of National
Defence.

3. Furthermore, journalists discovered that, whenever they attempted to ask
the Minister of Foreign Affairs Stéphane Dion his views on E-70 and a
commission of inquiry, journalists were directed by him or his
spokespersons to the Minister of National Defence as having sole charge
of the file – notwithstanding that the Minister of Foreign Affairs is the
senior minister when it comes to state-to-state relations whether in war
or peace and notwithstanding that, in multiple respects, the issue of
transfer of Afghan detainees involved the whole of government
including the (now) Department of Global Affairs and not merely the
Department of National Defence.

4. Since Minister Sajjan’s decision this past summer, I have made efforts to
have the government recognize the problem with having left this file to
Minister Sajjan and to revisit the decision, with Minister Sajjan recused
from involvement. These efforts include a letter to the Prime Minister
of September 19, 2016, which is attached and can also be found online
here: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/public_writing/57/ This
letter was copied to Minister Sajjan and his office acknowledged receipt.
To my knowledge, neither Minister Sajjan nor the Prime Minister have
acted to correct their error.

5. In brief, the reasons for which it was inappropriate for Minister Sajjan to
be the Minister to decide whether or not to call a commission of inquiry
can be summarized as follows:

a. Minister Sajjan was a serving officer in the Canadian Armed
Forces in Kandahar Province during the key years (2006-2007)
when many, if not most, of the problematic transfers took place.

b. Furthermore, Minister Sajjan was not simply present in theatre.
Rather, his role as an intelligence liaison officer placed him in
frequent and constant contact with the leadership of the agencies
that – there is every reason to believe – practised torture upon
persons in their custody, such as the National Directorate of
Security (NDS). He also had a liaison role with the Governor of
Kandahar who is known to have had a torture chamber in very
close proximity to Canadian facilities; while the Governor did
not receive detainees from Canada (as far as we know),
knowledge of his interrogation practices would have probative
value with respect to what Canadian actors should have been
aware could also happen at the hands of other actors like the
NDS.

c. In relation to that military-intelligence liaison role, Minister
Sajjan was anything but a minor player in Kandahar in the 20062007 period. Rather, a former commanding general, General
Fraser, credits the intelligence produced by or with the help of
Minister Sajjan as having led to hundreds of kills or captures of
presumed enemies. “Retired Brig.-Gen. David Fraser has said
Sajjan’s work as an intelligence officer and his activities in
Afghanistan helped lay the foundation for a military operation
that led to the death or capture of more than 1,500 insurgents, “
reports David Pugliese, “Afghan service puts Defence Minister
Sajjan in conflict of interest on detainees, say lawyers,” (June 21,
2016) Ottawa Citizen

http://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/afghanservice-puts-defence-minister-sajjan-in-conflict-of-interest-ondetainees-say-lawyers

d. Being on site during that period in that capacity, Minister Sajjan
was at least presumptively in a position to hear about and
possibly be a direct witness to evidence that is highly relevant to
the degree of knowledge various of his colleagues in the
commanding ranks of the Canadian Armed Forces had or likely
had about the risk of torture when captives in the hands of the
CAF were transferred to various Afghan government entities.

e. The “knowledge environment” is a crucial factual question in
determining whether and, if so, to what extent Canadian and/or
international law was compromised by transferring detainees to
Afghanistan – one of the questions a commission of inquiry
would be looking into. As such, a commission of inquiry would
be interested to learn from any member of the CAF with a role
that placed him or her proximate to either transfer decisionmakers on the Canadian end or to jailors/interrogators at the
Afghanistan end. A person in this role would almost certainly be
called as a witness by any commission of inquiry for purposes of
testimony on what he knew as to what others knew or should
have known about what would or could happen to detainees.

f. Finally, I attach a scanned two pages (pp. 150-151) from a book
written by former Globe and Mail journalist Graeme Smith and
called The Dogs Are Eating Them Now: Our War in Afghanistan
(Knopf Canada, 2013). These pages go directly to the question of
the kind of knowledge that military liaison officers such as
Minister Sajjan had with respect to the practice of torture by the
Afghanistan actors with whom they had to liaise. Mr. Smith was
the reporter whose Globe and Mail articles in April 2007
shocked the nation when he revealed he had been able to
interview some 30 men who alleged they had been brutalized
after having been transferred by Canada to Afghan authorities.
The indicated passages in his book are evidence of willful
blindness on the part of at least some military liaison officers,
who told Mr. Smith that they chose not to ask questions about
torture because they did not want to hear the answers. A central
question when it comes to “knowledge environments” is whether
or not key decision-makers deliberately cut themselves off from
specific knowledge in ways that still attracts their or their
institution’s responsibility because they had the means to know
and chose to remain – formally – ignorant. I say “formally”
because the passages from Mr. Smith’s book are palpably clear
that some of the military liaison officers had every reason to
believe torture was occurring – which is precisely why they did

not make specific inquiries. Again, I emphasize that none of this
is intended to link Minister Sajjan to decisions to transfer
detainees, but only to show that, as a military liaison, he may
well have his own insights into the efforts of members of the
Canadian Armed Forces to be willfully blind, including whether
or not such efforts as some of his military-liaison colleagues
engaged in were paralleled by similar efforts by the officers in
the command structure who decided on the policies and practices
related to transferring persons to the risk of torture. Such
information is especially crucial because one of the lingering and
unresolved questions around Canada’s transfer policy and
practice is whether Canada transferred persons to the risk of
torture in part because Canada wanted to receive any military
intelligence produced from interrogation of the persons
transferred. I attach the entire two pages but also reproduce
below key passages (italics are mine):
The liaison officers who worked near the [Governor’s]
palace were often smart guys, given the delicate task of
managing relationships with the governor and Afghan
security forces…..All of them said they did not hear or
see any indications of torture by Afghan authorities, but
that such tactics would be unsurprising. It was a violent
country, they said; it was unreasonable to expect the
Afghan forces to maintain high standards of conduct
when they faced insurgents who regularly beheaded their
captives. …The officers also cultivated close
relationships with Afghan security officials, including the
local [NDS] intelligence chief. They needed information
to save lives on the battlefield, so they avoided asking
questions about how Afghans conducted their
interrogations. In each of these conversations, …I talked
about what I learned from the detainees in Sarpoza
prison, and the scars on inmates’ bodies. Every time, I
got something like a shrug from the Canadian soldiers
….[A]ll of them maintained that NATO was only
supporting the sovereign government of Afghanistan.
They couldn’t understand why the media was ‘freaking
out’ over the detainees. ‘I made a point of never asking
how they got their information,’ an officer said. ‘if they
had told me about torture, it would have impeded my
ability to get the intelligence we needed about the
Taliban.’ …I came away from these conversations
weighed down with sadness. Somebody high up in the
ranks…told them to make friend with the Afghan
authorities. Those orders came down from a military
leadership that should have known ow distasteful such
arrangements were, how closely these troops were cooperating with torturers. …[I]ntelligence was passed up
the chain of command. My great fear is that somewhere
in the buzz of information, there was a terrible
calculation, a decision to avoid fighting by the rules.
I trust that the above demonstrates why Minister Sajjan may well prefer not to

have to testify at a commission of inquiry on the detainee question and thus why
I believe that, in a general ethical sense, Minister Sajjan was in a conflict of
interest when he took carriage of the commission of inquiry file (or accepted the
file if the allocation decision came from the Prime Minister’s Office or the
Privy Council Office). In my view, on any reasonable standard of
appropriateness, Minister Sajjan should have recused himself. Institutionally,
the decision related to E-70 should either have been a matter for the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, for the Prime Minister or for Cabinet as a whole (with the
Minister of National Defence not participating).
A question of law here, of course, is whether the Conflict of Interest Act
prohibits this kind of conflict of interest or whether you view this statute as so
narrow in its application that, on this matter, the Act does not apply. In my
view, any reasonable interpretation of the following provisions of the Conflict
of Interest Act does indeed capture the conduct of Minister Sajjan:
4. For the purposes of this Act, a public office holder is in
a conflict of interest when he or she exercises an official
power, duty or function that provides an opportunity to
further his or her private interests or those of his or her
relatives or friends or to improperly further another
person’s private interests.
5. Every public office holder shall arrange his or her private
affairs in a manner that will prevent the public office
holder from being in a conflict of interest.
6. (1) No public office holder shall make a decision or
participate in making a decision related to the exercise
of an official power, duty or function if the ublic office
holder knows or reasonably should know that, in the
making of the decision, he or she would be in a conflict
of interest.
(2) No minister of the Crown, minister of state or parliamentary
secretary shall, in his or her capacity as a member of the Senate
or the House of Commons, debate or vote on a question that
would place him or her in a conflict of interest.
7. No public office holder shall, in the exercise of an official
power, duty or function, give preferential treatment to any
person or organization based on the identity of the
person or organization that represents the first-mentioned
person or organization.
21. A public office holder shall recuse himself or herself
from any discussion, decision, debate or vote on any matter
in respect of which he or she would be in a conflict of
interest.
I believe that the following above-reproduced provisions have been
contravened: sections 6(1) and 21. The Minister may also be in breach of
section 6(2) by virtue of answers in Question Period, but any such breach flows
from the main provision, section 6(1), and is comparatively minor compared to
the refusal to recuse himself as required by section 21.
In addition, there could be an issue of non-compliance with section 7 by virtue

of the specific circumstances of this matter: having been a member of the
Canadian military (the Minister’s alma mater, so to speak) and now being
civilian head of the same military, there may be an appearance of Minister
Sajjan protecting an organization (the Canadian Armed Forces and/or the
Department of National Defence) in a way that exceeds the normal role of the
Minister in relation to the interests of his organization. As a matter of law, it
may be that “organization” cannot include government entities, but I leave that
for your determination.
I should also say that, while I note that the Conflict of Interest Act devotes
much attention to conflicts of financial interest, at no point does the Act limit
the definition of “private interest” to financial matters. As well, a purposive
interpretation of the Act would suggest what an impoverished understanding of
conflict of interest it would be if the Act were limited to matters concerning
money. Indeed, the negative-definition clause of the Act (section 2) is consistent
with such a purposive orientation, as it does nothing to suggest “private
interest” is limited to financial matters:
private interest does not include an interest in a decision
or matter
(a) that is of general application;
(b) that affects a public office holder as one of a broad
class of persons; or
(c) that concerns the remuneration or benefits received
by virtue of being a public office holder
Additionally, I trust that none of these three exceptions are applicable, for
obvious reasons I need not go into.
In relation to my own power as a citizen to bring this matter to your attention, I
am relying on the following section:
45 (1) If the Commissioner has reason to believe that a
public office holder or former public office holder has
contravened this Act, the Commissioner may examine
the matter on his or her own initiative.
On my understanding of the Conflict of Interest Act enforcement mechanisms,
citizens are not provided with the right to demand an investigation by directly
filing a complaint. However, section 45(1) is clearly a vehicle for a citizen to
provide the Commissioner with information that generates a “reason to believe
a public office holder …has contravened this Act”, at which time the
Commissioner has the power to start an examination on her own initiative.
This, thus, is the purpose of this letter. It is not a complaint but simultaneously
a letter of information and a letter of concern, which I hope you take most
seriously in order to make a decision about an examination under section 45(1).
There are no rules in the Conflict of Interest Act dealing with citizens keeping
confidential a letter of concern and information of the present sort. This letter
accordingly may be made public, which I believe will also fulfill a broader
public interest given that the possible conflict of interest of Minister Sajjan is a
matter of general interest that is already very much in the public domain. I will
only make this letter public once I am satisfied that the letter has been delivered
to you and that a copy has also been received by the Minister’s office – in each
case, with no fewer than 24 hours after receipt of the couriered letter. I will also
email this letter and attachments.

Thank you very much for considering my concerns and accompanying
information. I would be happy to respond to any questions you have as you
consider this matter.
Yours sincerely,

Craig Scott, Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Cc:

The Hon. Harjit Sajjan, Minister of National Defence,
Department of National Defence
National Defence Headquarters
Major-General George R. Pearkes Building
101 Colonel By Drive Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
K1A 0K2

Appendices
E-petition e-70 (Afghanistan)
42ND PARLIAMENT
Initiated by Craig Scott from Toronto, Ontario, on December 17, 2015, at 10:08 a.m. (EDT)
Petition to the Government of Canada
Whereas:


many Canadians remain ashamed by Canada's approach to Afghan detainees in relation to both
treatment in Canadian custody, notably transfer to other states despite the risk of torture, and
torture, other inhuman or degrading treatment, disappearance and/or extrajudicial killing to which
some of them fell victim after their transfer to other states; and



many also are disappointed by the poor record of Canadian justice and parliamentary institutions
in bringing the relevant facts to light and in securing proper accountability.

We, the undersigned, citizens of Canada, request (or call upon) the Government of Canada to establish
an independent judicial commission of inquiry to:
1. investigate the facts with respect to policies, practices, legal and other opinions, decisions, and conduct
of Canadian government actors, including Ministers and senior officials, concerning Afghan detainees
throughout Canada's involvements in Afghanistan from 2001;
2. investigate also the success and/or failure of Canada's justice and parliamentary systems in achieving
transparency, democratic accountability, and compliance with applicable laws; and
3. issue a thorough, comprehensive and public report on the facts as found and on the commission's
assessment of those facts in order: (a) to determine whether state or governmental responsibility arose
under international and/or Canadian law; (b) to assess whether any Canadian government officials
engaged in misconduct in relation to respect for law, legal process, or parliamentary procedure; and (c) to
recommend policy changes as well as law reform and parliamentary reform aimed at preventing
violations or misconduct occurring again.
4

RESPONSE TO PETITION
Prepare in English and French marking ‘Original Text’ or ‘Translation’

PETITION NO.: 421-00217
BY: MR. STEWART (BURNABY SOUTH)
DATE: MAY 3, 2016
PRINT NAME OF SIGNATORY: HONOURABLE HARJIT S. SAJJAN
Response by the Minister of National Defence

SIGNATURE

Minister or Parliamentary Secretary

SUBJECT
Afghanistan

ORIGINAL TEXT
REPLY
Throughout Canada’s military operations in Afghanistan, which began in October 2001 and ended in March 2014, the
Government of Canada was committed to ensuring that individuals detained by the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) were
handled and transferred or released in accordance with our obligations under international law. The CAF treated all
detainees humanely. The standards of protection afforded by the Third Geneva Convention were applied as a matter of
policy. Protections included providing detainees with food, shelter and necessary medical attention. In addition, specific
pre-deployment training for Canadian Armed Forces members involving the handling and transfer of detainees was
provided.
7B

After more than three decades of civil conflict, the capacity of the Afghan justice and correctional system was seriously
eroded. Canada and our allies understood the need to support law and order in Afghanistan by building the capacity of
the police, judicial and corrections sectors through targeted capacity-building efforts.
8B

We worked with and trained the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) to increase the Afghan
Government’s capacity to handle detainees appropriately. Canada made significant investments to help build capacity in
rule of law functions, including police, judicial and correctional services. Canada funded and worked closely with
9B
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independent organizations, including the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), to strengthen
their abilities to monitor, investigate, report and act on issues involving the treatment of detainees.
In the early stages of Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan, the CAF transferred Afghan detainees to United States (US)
authorities, and while on joint operations supporting capacity building of the ANDSF, transferred detainees to Afghan
authorities.
10B

In 2005, Canada established the Canada-Afghanistan arrangement for the Transfer of Detainees with the Government of
Afghanistan, which outlined roles and responsibilities with regard to the transfer of Canadian-taken detainees to Afghan
authorities. In particular, the Afghan government’s sovereign responsibility for all issues related to the rule of law and
justice in its territory underpinned the 2005 arrangement.
1B

In addition to setting the framework for transfers, this arrangement reinforced the commitments of both parties to
treating detainees humanely and in accordance with the standards of the Third Geneva Convention. This arrangement
also specifically prohibited the application of the death penalty to any Canadian-transferred detainee.
12B

In 2007, Canada signed a Supplementary Arrangement that clarified Canada’s expectations and the Government of
Afghanistan’s responsibilities. This arrangement provided Canadian officials with unrestricted and private access to
Canadian transferred detainees, and committed Afghan authorities to notify Canada when a detainee was transferred,
sentenced or released from custody, or had his status changed in any other way. Canada retained the right to refuse
follow-on transfers to a third party. In the case of allegations of mistreatment, the Afghan Government committed,
through this arrangement, to investigate and, when appropriate, bring to justice suspected offenders in accordance with
Afghan law and applicable international legal standards.
13B

In 2008, the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal examined Canada’s detainee policies and procedures in Amnesty
International Canada v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), 2008 FAC 336, affirmed by 2008 FACA 401, leave to
appeal to Supreme Court of Canada denied. In this decision, the Courts set out that International Law, including the Law
of Armed Conflict, provided the legal basis upon which the CAF conducts its operations and detainee handling.
14B

In 2010, the Vice Chief of Defence Staff convened a Board of Inquiry (BOI) in order to gain a clear understanding of the
specific details of an incident of 14 June 2006, in Afghanistan, during which a person in CAF custody was handed over to
Afghan authorities and then taken back by CAF personnel. Although the mandate of the BOI did not include undertaking
a broad examination of Canada’s detainee management system, the BOI did review the CAF Theatre Standing Order
(TSO) on detainees and determined that the subsequent amendments and improvements incorporated substantive
differences compared to the TSO that was in place in 2006. The appropriate changes were implemented in subsequent
rotations.
15B

On November 18, 2011, with Canada’s combat mission in Afghanistan coming to a close, Canada signed an arrangement
with the US to facilitate the transfer of individuals detained by the CAF in Afghanistan to US Forces custody. The CanadaUS arrangement built on and operated in parallel with the 2005 and 2007 arrangements signed between the
Government of Canada and the Government of Afghanistan. Together, these arrangements allowed Canadian officials to
monitor detention facilities, conduct interviews, and assess detainees’ conditions of detention and treatment. Global
Affairs Canada officials monitored the treatment of Canadian-transferred detainees in US or Afghan detention facilities
up to the point where detainees were sentenced by an Afghan court, or were released from custody. Canada’s
monitoring responsibilities ended in 2014 after the last Canadian-transferred detainee held in Afghan custody was
sentenced by an Afghan court.
16B
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When a detainee was taken, any decision to transfer was made by the Canadian Task Force Commander as an
operational matter. The Commander took into consideration the facts on the ground and input from a variety of
Canadian, international and Afghan sources. The Canadian Task Force Commander made every effort to hold detainees
no longer than 96 hours, during which time the CAF reviewed all available information and assessed whether further
detention, transfer or release was the appropriate course of action. Any transfers to facilities managed by Afghanistan or
other nations were assessed on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with applicable domestic and international law,
consistent with the terms set out in our arrangements with those nations.
17B

Operational decisions to hold detainees longer than ISAF guidelines may have occurred for a variety of reasons from
medical to administrative to security. These decisions were made by the Commander of Canadian Expeditionary Force
Command based on a recommendation from the Commander in Theatre and took into consideration the facts on the
ground and input from other government departments, particularly Global Affairs Canada.
18B

In the event of an allegation of abuse, Canada notified Afghan or US authorities, the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) and the AIHRC as appropriate, Canadian officials followed approved protocols, which could include focused
interviews with the detainee alleging abuse; follow up with the detaining authority; requests for investigations; an
enhanced frequency of follow-up visits; and demarches with relevant authorities. If Canada had any concerns that our
partners were not abiding by the arrangements, the CAF Commander in Afghanistan could decide to pause or suspend
further transfers.
19B

In 2012, the Military Police Complaints Commission (MPCC) completed a Public Interest Hearing into a complaint that
certain Military Police (MP) wrongly failed to investigate CAF Commanders for allegedly ordering the transfer of Afghan
detainees to a known risk of torture at the hands of Afghan security forces. The Commission’s investigation and hearing
process spanned nearly four years. During this time, it heard testimony from 40 witnesses, including the eight subjects
of the complaint, and held 47 days of public hearings from 2008 to 2011. The Commission also reviewed thousands of
documents throughout its investigation. The Commission found the complaints against the eight individual MPs were
unsubstantiated.
20B

In 2015, the Commission Chairperson made a decision to conduct a Public Interest Investigation into an anonymous
complaint relating to the investigation of alleged mistreatment of detainees by the Military Police in Afghanistan in
2010-11. The complaint made allegations about the conduct of Military Police members involved in ordering and/or
conducting exercises where the mistreatment was alleged to have occurred. The complaint also challenges the failure to
lay charges or take any other action following investigations conducted by the Canadian Forces National Investigation
Service (CFNIS) and the MP Chain of Command in 2011 and 2012. The MPCC is currently awaiting disclosure of relevant
material from the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal (CFPM). Once disclosure is received, the Commission will determine
the scope of the investigation, identify the individual subjects of the complaint and notify them. It will then begin to
interview witnesses and review materials.
21B

Canada is proud of the honourable work of the men and women in uniform and civilian officials who served in
Afghanistan. Canada remains the leading donor supporting the work of the AIHRC to strengthen its capacity to fulfill its
constitutional mandate to monitor human rights in Afghanistan. Throughout Canada’s military operations in
Afghanistan, the Government of Canada ensured individuals detained by the CAF were treated humanely and handled,
transferred or released in accordance with our obligations under international law. Therefore the Government of
Canada does not believe an independent judicial commission of inquiry is necessary.
2B
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The Right Hon. Justin Trudeau,
Prime Minister of Canada,
Office of the Prime Minister
80 Wellington St,
Ottawa, ON
K1A 0A2
September 19, 2016
OSGOODE HALL
LAW SCHOOL
4700 Keele St.
Toronto ON
Canada M3J 1P3
Tel 416 736 5030
Fax 416 736 5736
www.osgoode.yorku.ca

Dear Prime Minister,
RE: Commission of Inquiry on Afghan Detainees
As you are likely aware, Minister of Defence Sajjan, on behalf of the
Government of Canada, rejected the request in House of Commons E-Petition
E-70 for a commission of inquiry on various aspects of Canada’s policy and
practice with respect to the treatment of detainees in Afghanistan. For your
ease of reference, I attach E-70 and Minister of Sajjan’s response (Appendices 1
and 2). I write to ask you to review, and reverse, the decision of your Minister
of Defence.
Coincidentally, I write, as the new Parliamentary sitting begins, on the same day
that CBC has begun detailed reporting on the complicity of the RCMP, CSIS
and the Department of (then) Foreign Affairs in torture overseas of three
Canadians during the previous Liberal government’s tenure. The documentation
revealed by civil litigation has produced incontrovertible evidence of the
willingness of officials under the previous government to arrange for the
detention and interrogation of Canadians by a government that our officials
knew would torture those Canadians.
Today’s revelations are directly relevant to the Afghan-detainee question. If
officials serving within a Liberal administration are capable of deliberate
violation of both Canadian and international criminal law (whether with or
without the sanction of ‘legal advice’ of government lawyers), why would
anyone think that the same mindsets and willingness would not exist and be
given room to act within the government of Mr. Harper in relation to
Afghanistan? Only a commission of inquiry on the Afghan detainees will be
able to examine all the relevant paper trails – including the many documents
withheld from a 2010-2011 ad hoc parliamentary process on the basis of
solicitor-client privilege – to determine exactly why and with what knowledge
Canadian decision-makers persisted in sending hundreds and hundreds of people
to brutalization at the hands of Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security,
Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, affiliated paramilitaries and
quite possibly US actors as well.
To return specifically to Minister Sajjan’s negative decision, he opens and
closes his response with virtually the same emphatic claim. The penultimate
sentence in the response reads: “Throughout Canada’s military operations in
Afghanistan, the Government of Canada ensured individuals detained by the
CAF were treated humanely and handled, transferred or released in accordance
with our obligations under international law.” No serious legal scholar or close

observer of this issue believes this to be true, in view of all the facts that are
known despite much effort by the previous government. Nor, I imagine, would
most Liberal MPs, while in opposition, have dreamed a member of a new
Liberal Cabinet would make such a sweeping and inaccurate statement.
I also attach the statement I released immediately following Minister Sajjan’s
response to E-70 (Appendix 3). In that statement, I make an observation that I
believe to be fully accurate which, to the extent it is indeed accurate, may help
you realize that this whole file does need a second look by you personally. I
reproduce it below:
[Minister Sajjan’s response to E-70] is full of gaps, elisions, and
misdirection. …An analysis of those problems will come later. For the
moment, I will limit myself to [the] truly shocking blanket claim that
ends the government’s response…. These words could have been penned,
word for word, by the previous Conservative government. …[T]he fact
is they may well have been written by some of the same officials and
lawyers who ran the Harper-era messaging strategy. It is deeply
disappointing that the Liberal government has chosen to add another
link to a chain of complicity that for over a decade has seen non-stop
efforts on the part of various Canadian government actors to hide the
truth and block any form of accountability. I had expected far more
from this government.
Apart from one major matter addressed below, it continues not to be my purpose
to lay bare, at the moment, the considerable number of “gaps, elisions and
misdirection” in Minister Sajjan’s response. That day will come soon enough if
your government does indeed choose to endorse the Harper legacy and continue
to reject a commission of inquiry.
As already noted, the reason I am now writing is to urge your direct intervention
on this file. I respectfully request that you inform yourself of what information
the Government of Canada already has at its disposal that points to the
compelling need for a commission of inquiry – and to then ensure that Minister
Sajjan’s decision is reversed by Cabinet. As part of such an intervention, I
respectfully suggest that you specifically consult with your Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Stéphane Dion, as to whether or not he has reason to believe a
commission would be beneficial for our democracy, the rule of law and
Canada’s reputation in the world, given information at his disposal and any
briefings he or his staff have sought and received since he became Minister of
Foreign Affairs.
Not only did Mr. Dion, as Member of Parliament in the then Official
Opposition, have some exposure – although by no means full exposure – to
some relevant documentation when an ad hoc parliamentary working group was
set up in 2010 in response to the Speaker’s ruling against Mr. Harper’s
government, but also he may well now have had the opportunity to acquire
further information from any of a number of civil servants in his department
with knowledge of what went on under the previous government. The
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institutional knowledge of these civil servants may possibly include what may
have taken place by way of a cover-up across various departments and the PMO.
In this regard, do recall that Minister Dion stated, when a batch of redacted
documents were released in 2011 by the Harper government as an outcome of
the compromise parliamentary process in which he participated, that “[w]hen
you read these documents, you will have questions to ask to your Prime Minister
and your Ministers.” Keep in mind that Minister Dion would have seen the text
behind some of the redactions – alongside generally appreciating what gaps and
elisions of the overall documentary record placed before the committee – and
formed a view about the kinds of unanswered questions and still-hidden facts
that were still outstanding.
I mentioned above that there is one major matter I did want to address arising
from Minister Sajjan’s response to E-70. As part of your consultation, I would
ask that you specifically ask both Minister Dion and Minister Sajjan whether or
not either of them or their officials have information about a system used by the
last government and the Canadian military to avoid registering persons taken
captive by Canadian troops in Afghanistan – and to thereby facilitate Canada’s
ability to transfer detainees to Afghanistan government agencies (and possibly
even to the US) without informing the International Committee of the Red Cross
or the then Department of Foreign Affairs, such that neither the ICRC nor
DFAIT would know to undertake any monitoring of such persons and such that
these off-the-books detainees effectively disappeared.
As the consequence of over three years of making inquiries and investigating
while Member of Parliament for Toronto-Danforth (2011-2015) along with
considerable further digging since my defeat in the October 19, 2015, election, I
have multiple reasons for believing that the Canadian Department of National
Defence replicated, at least in part, an American parallel detainee system that
treated detainees ‘off the books’ by labelling some detainees as “Persons Under
Control” (or PUCs) with possible terminological variations like “persons under
custody” (also producing PUCs as an acronym). One hint of such a system arose
from failure of the military to redact part of an (otherwise heavily redacted)
CAF Board of Inquiry report that referred briefly and obliquely to “PUCs.”
Other evidence exists. At least one Canadian soldier has revealed that, in some
contexts, soldiers were told to desist from calling persons in their custody
“detainees.” Also, there is evidence Canadian Special Forces spoke amongst
themselves of “PUC kits” (which I am assuming included things like wrist
restraints and so on). And, disturbing conclusions arise from scrutiny of various
published contemporary histories and memoirs in which the numbers of
prisoners taken by Canadian forces in certain engagements and operations are
reported. When these accounts are compared to official records of detainees that
came out through the ad hoc parliamentary process, there appears to be evidence
of many dozens, possibly into the hundreds, of Afghan prisoners who were
detained ‘off the books’ (as they do not figure in the official detainee numbers),
with an unknown number of them transferred on to various Afghan authorities.
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There may have been many more PUC’ed than that, because these comparisons
are subject to the hit-and-miss coverage of incidents and missions in published
accounts. In this respect, whereas we all became used to the detainee issue
being one involving transfer to the substantial risk of torture (and actual
resulting torture) at the hands of the National Directorate of Security, I am
greatly concerned that some, if not many, of these PUC’ed detainees were
passed to the Afghan National Police, Afghan National Army, and/or
paramilitary units not ‘just’ to subsequent abuse but also quite probably to
extrajudicial execution.
It is apparent that the military has wanted to keep this PUC category secret. One
confirmation of this came when I filed an Order Paper Question Q-1117 (41st
Parliament) while MP for Toronto Danforth, the fourth or fifth I filed on the
detainee issue. A number of the sub-questions in Q-1117 were aimed at getting
an answer from the government whether there was a category beyond official
“detainees.” I reproduce the sub-questions intended to elicit answers related to
PUC’ed detainees and related transfers (omitting sub-questions [a] to [l] and [u]
onward, which concern other matters):
…
(m) in relation to the May 25, 2006, capture of “11 suspected Taliban
fighters” referenced at page 96 of Ian Hope, Dancing with the
Dushman: Command Imperatives for the Counter-Insurgency Fight in
Afghanistan (Canadian Defence Agency Press, 2008), could the
government set out the manner in which each of these 11 persons
controlled by Canadian forces were processed, including what is known
about each’s subsequent trajectory after passing from the control of
Canada until the point at which the government may have lost track of
their whereabouts;
(n) at any period and, if so, which periods, did the Canadian government
consider that there were one or more categories of persons who Canada
passed on to either Afghan or American authorities but who were not
categorized as detainees, and did such categories have a designation,
whether formal or informal;
(o) were there persons under the control of Canadian forces who were
transferred to Afghanistan, but who were not treated by Canada as
covered by the provisions of the 2005 and 2007 Canada-Afghanistan
Memorandums of Understanding on detainee transfer and, if so, on what
basis were transfers of such persons not deemed covered by the
agreements;
(p) were there persons under the control of Canadian forces who were
transferred to Afghanistan but whose existence and transfer was not
made known to the International Committee of the Red Cross and, if so,
on what basis was the Red Cross not informed;
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(q) during the 2011 Parliamentary process in which a Panel of Arbiters
decided what information could be released to Parliament, were
documents withheld from this process by the government if they
concerned the transfer of persons that were not treated by Canada as
covered by the provisions of the 2005 and 2007 Canada-Afghanistan
Memorandums of Understanding on detainee transfer;
(r) between September 12, 2001, and the entry into effect of the 2005
detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding, (i) how many
detainees were transferred to US authorities, (ii) to which US
authorities, (iii) how many detainees were transferred to Afghan
authorities, (iv) to which Afghan authorities, (v) how many persons
under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada,
were transferred to US authorities, (vi) to which US authorities, (vii)
how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as
detainees by Canada, were transferred to Afghan authorities, (viii) to
which Afghan authorities;
(s) between the entry into effect of the 2005 detainee-transfer
Memorandum of Understanding and the entry into effect of the 2007
detainee-transfer Memorandum of Understanding, (i) how many
detainees were transferred to US authorities, (ii) to which US
authorities, (iii) how many detainees were transferred to Afghan
authorities, (iv) to which Afghan authorities, (v) how many persons
under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada,
were transferred to US authorities, (vi) to which US authorities, (vii)
how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as
detainees by Canada, were transferred to Afghan authorities, (viii) to
which Afghan authorities;
(t) between the entry into effect of the 2007 detainee-transfer
Memorandum of Understanding and the present date, (i) how many
detainees were transferred to US authorities, (ii) to which US
authorities, (iii) how many detainees were transferred to Afghan
authorities, (iv) to which Afghan authorities, (v) how many persons
under the control of Canada, but not considered as detainees by Canada,
were transferred to US authorities, (vi) to which US authorities, (vii)
how many persons under the control of Canada, but not considered as
detainees by Canada, were transferred to Afghan authorities, (viii) to
which Afghan authorities…
It is clear that the government understood what I was asking, and that I was
giving them the opportunity to reveal the existence of a category called “Persons
Under Control” or a like category such as “persons under custody.” This the
government did not do, although it did acknowledge in general terms something
significant, namely that Canada did use other terms for persons “detained” other
than “detainees” – while also seeming to indicate persons not formally called
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“detainees” could also be transferred no differently than persons formally
treated as “detainees.” This alone is very significant information. I reproduce a
passage that is used as part of the answers to four of the sub-questions
(specifically sub-questions [n], [r], [s], and [t]):
Since the start of their operations in Afghanistan, the Canadian Armed
Forces have, as a matter of policy, treated all persons in Canadian care,
custody or control, humanely, in accordance with the same established
Government of Canada process for handling, release, transfer or posttransfer monitoring, and in accordance with our obligations under
international law. Several terms were used to refer to persons detained
by the Canadian Armed Forces, including "detainees". The use of these
terms did not in any way affect the Canadian Armed Forces'
appreciation of their obligations towards these individuals. Whether or
not the term "detainee" was applied in a particular case has never been
a factor in determining Canada's processes for handling, release,
transfer or post-transfer monitoring of persons under Canadian Armed
Forces care, custody or control. [my emphasis]
The overall impression the government (through Defence Minister Peter
MacKay) wants to leave is that categorization did not make any difference
because all “persons in Canadian care, custody or control” were treated
humanely, legally and according to processes no less legal or humane according
to the category used. However, careful reading of the language in these
identical passages reveals lawyerly hedging on exactly what the government
was indeed saying. Apart from a circumlocution in sentence structure that
creates interesting challenges in determining exactly what is being claimed,
there are also potentially significant gaps in the list of things Canada is said to
do regardless of the label of the person in custody; note that registration/recordkeeping of captives is not necessarily included in “handling” and note that there
is no specific statement that notification of the International Committee of the
Red Cross is one of the always-present practices.
But most significant is that, although Minister MacKay and its drafters uses this
exact above-quoted formula as part of answering four sub-questions (“n” and
then “r”, “s” and “t”), for some reason they decided not to employ this language
for “o” and “p” when the formula would appear to be no less relevant. What
were “o” and “p” about? Recall that they asked whether some persons in
Canadian custody or control were, first of all, deemed not to be covered by the
transfer agreements signed with Afghanistan and, secondly, deemed not to
require notification to the International Committee of the Red Cross. Why,
when this formula proved so relevant for other answers, was it not called in aid
for these questions? From my experience with many Order Paper Questions
while an MP, the government was never shy to write exactly the same answer
for every sub-question they deemed applicable. I believe there is a good chance
that their omission of this formula in “o” and “p” could easily be because the
answer to each of these crucial questions was “Yes”, but the Department of
National Defence wanted to avoid saying that at all cost.
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Then, when one reads what the answer to sub-question “o” was, one
immediately notices that it does not actually answer the question asked. Rather,
it gives one solitary example of a transfer not done according to MOU terms,
and then conspicuously fails to say anything like “and this is the only instance.”
So that you can understand the ‘style’ of the government answer along the
above-described lines, the answer to sub-question “o” is reproduced below:
On one occasion, the Canadian Armed Forces took custody of an
individual who, on the basis of credible grounds, was suspected of
having committed a criminal act when employed at a Canadian Armed
Forces facility in Afghanistan. The individual was not an insurgent, and
was not arrested for a reason related to the Canadian Armed Forces
mission in Afghanistan.
Consistent with standard Canadian Armed Forces procedures for
addressing crimes committed or purportedly committed by local
nationals at Canadian Armed Forces facilities outside of Canada, the
Canadian Armed Forces transferred this individual to the custody of an
appropriate Afghan authority for investigation. The individual was
visited periodically by Canadian staff while in Afghan custody to confirm
that he had not been mistreated.
As for the answer to sub-question (p), what is striking is that, here, Minister
MacKay’s answer reverts to referring only to “detainees” when specifying who
the ICRC had been notified about. The answer reads as follows:
Prior to June 2007, the Department of National Defence and the
Canadian Armed Forces followed standard procedures which included
providing the International Committee of the Red Cross with detailed
information on each detainee captured by the Canadian Armed Forces,
and notification of their release or transfer to Afghan custody. [my
emphasis]
On June 26, 2006, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International
trade started to also provide similar notifications to the. International
Committee of the Red Cross, in parallel with the Department of National
Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. On June 2, 2007, the
responsibility for notifying the International Committee of the Red Cross
was formally transferred from the Department of National Defence and
the Canadian Armed Forces to the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade.
If you revert to the formula (reproduced earlier) that the government used in
answers to four other sub-questions, you will see the government is careful to
structure the passage so that “persons detained” is not the same thing as
“detainees”, which makes it potentially significant that, here, in the response to
sub-question (p), they take care to use only the narrower “detainee.” I believe it
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is more than possible that the ICRC were only notified of “detainees” and not of
“persons detained” (including PUC’s) more broadly. And I believe it to be
likely that the Department of National Defence crafted its answer to Order Paper
Question Q1117 in order to avoid revealing this.
Since being defeated as MP, I have done some further digging and have traced
the likely origin of a PUC system to its invention in the winter/spring of 2002 by
the American military in Afghanistan. One account (from a former US military
interrogator) of the origin of the term suggests that a somewhat benign reason
for the new PUC category may have been to allow captured Afghans to be more
easily released after interrogation if interrogation led to the conclusion they were
not combatants; this account notes that, in this first year after 9/11, the US
military found it difficult to secure the release of some prisoners once their
names had been formally entered into the record system. Whether this rationale
was or was not at the heart of the origin of PUC’ing by the US, what seems
highly probable from my research is that the system then morphed
(“metastasized” is probably a better term) in Iraq into a full-blown system of
off-the-record detention and disappearance carried out by multiple American
actors in Iraq after the invasion of that country in 2003.
Whether and how PUC’ing was adopted by Canada alongside an official
detention system in Afghanistan would undoubtedly be one of the central tasks
of a commission of inquiry to determine. But, if there was such a PUC system,
several pathways seem possible (there may be others):
(a) In Iraq from January 2004 to January 2005, Canada had at least one senior
officer on the ground. Walter Natynczyk was seconded to play a major role
commanding 35,000 US forces in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Indeed,
he received a prestigious military medal from Canada for commanding combat
operations in this war that Canada had deliberately not taken part in qua country.
As you will know, Natynczyk was later appointed Vice-Chief of Defence Staff
under General Hillier in 2006, and came to play a key role in Afghanistan.
Between his role in Iraq and his elevation to Vice-Chief status, he assumed a
role that would have given him an extra exposure to detention and transfer
issues as head of the Land Force Doctrine and Training system.
(b) It could be that learning about the US PUC system took place at desk level
versus in the field -- namely, back in North America. In the relevant period,
there would have been regular close exchanges between our military and
intelligence agencies and the Pentagon and CIA, whether at the very top (e.g.
via General Hillier, when Chief of Defence Staff) or at a more functional level.
As for the latter, Lt-General Michel Gauthier headed DND’s military
intelligence for a couple years, a role which would have involved close
collaboration with the US on intelligence-oriented practices and policies in the
‘war on terror’. Indeed, Washington, DC, sources of mine suggest that it is also
worth asking whether a meeting between Gauthier and Defence Secretary
Rumsfeld’s most valued advisor, Under-Secretary of Defence for Intelligence
Steve Cambone, led to expectations that Canada would closely align its
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Kandahar-related policy and practices with US’ ‘war on terror’ imperatives and
methods in exchange for Canada being handed Kandahar (in preference to the
UK, which wanted it instead of Helmand). Subsequently, for key periods, LtGen. Gauthier was a (if not, the) central decision-maker on when, whether and
how Canada would transfer Afghan prisoners to Afghanistan. As his mini-bio
also says on The Governance Network’s website, Gauthier “[l]ed Canadian
Expeditionary Force Command, responsible for all CF operational missions
abroad, the Canadian mission in southern Afghanistan.”
(c) It could be that Canadian forces were (or, were also) directly schooled in
PUC’ing by American forces in Afghanistan itself, either at the time of the
handover to Canada in Kandahar in early 2006 or through more longstanding
relations arising from the joint operations of US and Canadian special forces.
All three of these could well have played a role in the evolution of a Canadian
PUC’ing system in Afghanistan.
I have a good number of other reasons that lead me to believe that a commission
of inquiry is as warranted and indispensable now as it was when opposition
parties called for it on multiple occasions in the 2007-2011 period. They include
troubling questions about the role of government lawyers across a number of
ministries. However, I am highlighting the issue of PUC’s both because this is
information that has remained largely hidden from view. Also, if true, an
accountability-avoiding PUC system would take the matter to another plane of
wrongdoing and would also demonstrably disprove many of the claims of the
Harper government, the Canadian military, and now Minister Sajjan that Canada
under the Conservatives took care not to be complicit in torture of persons we
transferred from our custody.
If the possible existence of a PUC system and its consequences are news to you,
then I trust that you will appreciate how a commission of inquiry is the
minimum necessary response. In this regard, please note that I raise this with
you directly as Prime Minister as a last resort. Allow me to elaborate.
My work as MP on this issue was intended to lead to a plan of action should the
NDP have formed government or been part of a government. When that went
by the wayside, I initiated e-petition E-70 shortly after my October 2015 defeat
(in December 2015). Well before the response to E-70 was due, I made sure to
remind the government that the Q-1117 questions had not come from nowhere,
and that my suspicions about a PUC policy/practice had not gone away. I did
this by giving an interview that resulted in the possibility Canada had a PUC
system being published in an article written by Canadian Press journalist,
Murray Brewster.
While my preference would have been for concerns about a PUC system to be
raised once a commission of inquiry was in place, I felt I needed to go public in
relation to E-70 so that there would be no excuse for various government
departments not to start to do the necessary legwork to look into this PUC
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matter ahead of making the decision on E-70’s request for a commission of
inquiry. Despite some of my cynicism that developed after four years of being
an MP and watching how government worked under the Harper government, I
allowed myself to be hopeful that this new information, aired publicly in the
national press, would help spur your government to make good on your
expressed desire to lead a government that would be much more attentive to
democratic values, the rule of law, human rights and our reputation in the world.
You can thus imagine my disappointment when the response from Minister
Sajjan was published.
This letter, accordingly, is my good faith effort to ask one last time that your
government, and that you as a Prime Minister of a very different stripe from
your predecessor, do the right thing on this file. After consulting your Minister
of Foreign Affairs and more widely as needed, I would accordingly ask you to
request that your Cabinet exercise its authority under the Inquiries Act to
establish a royal commission with a mandate along the lines of what E-70 was
requesting
I should say something further. I regret that I feel I have no choice but to appeal
directly to you as Prime Minister and make what would ordinarily be a
redundant request that the Minister of Foreign Affairs be brought into a file of
this sort. However, all indications are that the Department of Global Affairs was
cut out of the decision-making chain on e-petition E-70. Just for example,
journalists who sought Minister Dion’s views on E-70 (and his explanation for
why he was not leading the file) were told by Department of Global Affairs
officials to contact the Department of National Defence.
This management of the file deliberately sidelined the Minister who should,
along with the Prime Minister, have had charge of this file. There are two
reasons for this, which are set out in a posting I placed online on June 10, ahead
of Minister Sajjan’s response (attached as Appendix 4). One is that Minister
Sajjan is in a conflict of interest in ruling on this file; not only should he not
have assumed what appears to be virtually sole carriage of the file, he should
have recused himself from any part in the decision. The second is that this file
should involve the entire Cabinet, not just due to the importance of the issues
but also given how many different ministries were part of detainee policy and
were also part of the previous Government’s obstructionist and untruthful
responses to revelations about the treatment of detainees transferred by Canada.
From the beginning, it probably should have been you as Prime Minister,
supported by the Privy Council office and in consultation with Cabinet, who
should have issued the response to E-70 – or, if not, Foreign Minister Dion after
consultation with you and Cabinet. As it stands, you do have the opportunity to
take a close second look at this because, as far as I know, you have yet to reply
to the June 7, 2016, open letter written to you by a number of prominent
Canadians including one of Canada’s most respected elder statespersons, the
Right Hon. Joe Clark, in which you were asked to call a commission of inquiry.
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I end by reiterating my request that you review this matter and personally decide
whether you support Minister Sajjan’s decision or whether, upon reflection and
wider consultation, you believe the decision was too hasty and in error. I hope
you choose the honourable path, which I trust you will recognize is also the wise
path. We need – at minimum – an independent judicial commission of inquiry.
Yours most respectfully,

Craig Scott,
Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School;
former MP for Toronto-Danforth
cc:

The Hon. Stéphane Dion, Minister of Foreign Affairs
The Hon. Harjit Sajjan, Minister of National Defence
The Hon. Thomas Mulcair, MP & Leader of the NDP
Hélène Laverdière, MP & NDP Foreign Affairs Critics
Randall Garrison, MP & NDP National Defence Critic
Elizabeth May, MP & Leader of the Green Party

11

Appendices to
Letter to Prime Minister Trudeau of September 19, 2016
from Professor Craig Scott
Appendix 1
E-petition e-70 (Afghanistan)
42ND PARLIAMENT
Initiated by Craig Scott from Toronto, Ontario, on December 17, 2015, at 10:08 a.m. (EDT)
Petition to the Government of Canada
Whereas:




many Canadians remain ashamed by Canada's approach to Afghan detainees in relation
to both treatment in Canadian custody, notably transfer to other states despite the risk
of torture, and torture, other inhuman or degrading treatment, disappearance and/or
extrajudicial killing to which some of them fell victim after their transfer to other states;
and
many also are disappointed by the poor record of Canadian justice and parliamentary
institutions in bringing the relevant facts to light and in securing proper accountability.

We, the undersigned, citizens of Canada, request (or call upon) the Government of Canada to
establish an independent judicial commission of inquiry to:
1. investigate the facts with respect to policies, practices, legal and other opinions, decisions,
and conduct of Canadian government actors, including Ministers and senior officials,
concerning Afghan detainees throughout Canada's involvements in Afghanistan from 2001;
2. investigate also the success and/or failure of Canada's justice and parliamentary systems in
achieving transparency, democratic accountability, and compliance with applicable laws; and
3. issue a thorough, comprehensive and public report on the facts as found and on the
commission's assessment of those facts in order: (a) to determine whether state or
governmental responsibility arose under international and/or Canadian law; (b) to assess
whether any Canadian government officials engaged in misconduct in relation to respect for
law, legal process, or parliamentary procedure; and (c) to recommend policy changes as well as
law reform and parliamentary reform aimed at preventing violations or misconduct occurring
again.
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Appendix 2

Response to E-70 by the Government of Canada, Tabled June 16, 2016
RESPONSE TO PETITION
Prepare in English and French marking ‘Original Text’ or ‘Translation’
PETITION NO.: 421-00217
BY: MR. STEWART (BURNABY SOUTH)
DATE: MAY 3, 2016
PRINT NAME OF SIGNATORY: HONOURABLE HARJIT S. SAJJAN
Response by the Minister of National Defence
SIGNATURE
Minister or Parliamentary Secretary
SUBJECT
Afghanistan
ORIGINAL TEXT REPLY
Throughout Canada’s military operations in Afghanistan, which began in October 2001 and
ended in March 2014, the Government of Canada was committed to ensuring that individuals
detained by the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) were handled and transferred or released in
accordance with our obligations under international law. The CAF treated all detainees
humanely. The standards of protection afforded by the Third Geneva Convention were applied
as a matter of policy. Protections included providing detainees with food, shelter and necessary
medical attention. In addition, specific pre-deployment training for Canadian Armed Forces
members involving the handling and transfer of detainees was provided.
After more than three decades of civil conflict, the capacity of the Afghan justice and
correctional system was seriously eroded. Canada and our allies understood the need to
support law and order in Afghanistan by building the capacity of the police, judicial and
corrections sectors through targeted capacity-building efforts.
We worked with and trained the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) to
increase the Afghan Government’s capacity to handle detainees appropriately. Canada made
significant investments to help build capacity in
rule of law functions, including police, judicial and correctional services. Canada funded and
worked closely with independent organizations, including the Afghanistan Independent Human
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Rights Commission (AIHRC), to strengthen their abilities to monitor, investigate, report and act
on issues involving the treatment of detainees.
In the early stages of Canada’s engagement in Afghanistan, the CAF transferred Afghan
detainees to United States (US) authorities, and while on joint operations supporting
capacity building of the ANDSF, transferred detainees to Afghan authorities.
In 2005, Canada established the Canada-Afghanistan arrangement for the Transfer of
Detainees with the Government of Afghanistan, which outlined roles and responsibilities with
regard to the transfer of Canadian-taken detainees to Afghan authorities. In particular, the
Afghan government’s sovereign responsibility for all issues related to the rule of law and
justice in its territory underpinned the 2005 arrangement.
In addition to setting the framework for transfers, this arrangement reinforced the
commitments of both parties to treating detainees humanely and in accordance with the
standards of the Third Geneva Convention. This arrangement also specifically prohibited
the application of the death penalty to any Canadian-transferred detainee.
In 2007, Canada signed a Supplementary Arrangement that clarified Canada’s expectations
and the Government of Afghanistan’s responsibilities. This arrangement provided Canadian
officials with unrestricted and private access to Canadian transferred detainees, and
committed Afghan authorities to notify Canada when a detainee was transferred, sentenced
or released from custody, or had his status changed in any other way. Canada retained the
right to refuse follow-on transfers to a third party. In the case of allegations of mistreatment,
the Afghan Government committed, through this arrangement, to investigate and, when
appropriate, bring to justice suspected offenders in accordance with Afghan law and
applicable international legal standards.
In 2008, the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal examined Canada’s detainee policies
and procedures in Amnesty International Canada v. Canada (Minister of National Defence),
2008 FAC 336, affirmed by 2008 FACA 401, leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada
denied. In this decision, the Courts set out that International Law, including the Law of
Armed Conflict, provided the legal basis upon which the CAF conducts its operations and
detainee handling.
In 2010, the Vice Chief of Defence Staff convened a Board of Inquiry (BOI) in order to gain a
clear understanding of the specific details of an incident of 14 June 2006, in Afghanistan,
during which a person in CAF custody was handed over to Afghan authorities and then taken
back by CAF personnel. Although the mandate of the BOI did not include undertaking a
broad examination of Canada’s detainee management system, the BOI did review the CAF
Theatre Standing Order (TSO) on detainees and determined that the subsequent
amendments and improvements incorporated substantive differences compared to the TSO
that was in place in 2006. The appropriate changes were implemented in subsequent
rotations.
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On November 18, 2011, with Canada’s combat mission in Afghanistan coming to a close,
Canada signed an arrangement with the US to facilitate the transfer of individuals detained by
the CAF in Afghanistan to US Forces custody. The Canada- US arrangement built on and
operated in parallel with the 2005 and 2007 arrangements signed between the Government
of Canada and the Government of Afghanistan. Together, these arrangements allowed
Canadian officials to monitor detention facilities, conduct interviews, and assess detainees’
conditions of detention and treatment. Global Affairs Canada officials monitored the
treatment of Canadian-transferred detainees in US or Afghan detention facilities up to the
point where detainees were sentenced by an Afghan court, or were released from custody.
Canada’s monitoring responsibilities ended in 2014 after the last Canadian-transferred
detainee held in Afghan custody was sentenced by an Afghan court.
When a detainee was taken, any decision to transfer was made by the Canadian Task Force
Commander as an operational matter. The Commander took into consideration the facts on the
ground and input from a variety of Canadian, international and Afghan sources. The Canadian
Task Force Commander made every effort to hold detainees no longer than 96 hours, during
which time the CAF reviewed all available information and assessed whether further detention,
transfer or release was the appropriate course of action. Any transfers to facilities managed by
Afghanistan or other nations were assessed on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with
applicable domestic and international law, consistent with the terms set out in our
arrangements with those nations.
Operational decisions to hold detainees longer than ISAF guidelines may have occurred for a
variety of reasons from medical to administrative to security. These decisions were made by
the Commander of Canadian Expeditionary Force Command based on a recommendation
from the Commander in Theatre and took into consideration the facts on the ground and
input from other government departments, particularly Global Affairs Canada.
In the event of an allegation of abuse, Canada notified Afghan or US authorities, the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the AIHRC as appropriate, Canadian
officials followed approved protocols, which could include focused interviews with the
detainee alleging abuse; follow up with the detaining authority; requests for investigations; an
enhanced frequency of follow-up visits; and demarches with relevant authorities. If Canada
had any concerns that our partners were not abiding by the arrangements, the CAF
Commander in Afghanistan could decide to pause or suspend further transfers.
In 2012, the Military Police Complaints Commission (MPCC) completed a Public Interest
Hearing into a complaint that certain Military Police (MP) wrongly failed to investigate CAF
Commanders for allegedly ordering the transfer of Afghan detainees to a known risk of
torture at the hands of Afghan security forces. The Commission’s investigation and hearing
process spanned nearly four years. During this time, it heard testimony from 40 witnesses,
including the eight subjects of the complaint, and held 47 days of public hearings from 2008
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to 2011. The Commission also reviewed thousands of documents throughout its investigation.
The Commission found the complaints against the eight individual MPs were unsubstantiated.
In 2015, the Commission Chairperson made a decision to conduct a Public Interest
Investigation into an anonymous complaint relating to the investigation of alleged
mistreatment of detainees by the Military Police in Afghanistan in 2010-11. The complaint
made allegations about the conduct of Military Police members involved in ordering and/or
conducting exercises where the mistreatment was alleged to have occurred. The complaint
also challenges the failure to lay charges or take any other action following investigations
conducted by the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service (CFNIS) and the MP Chain of
Command in 2011 and 2012. The MPCC is currently awaiting disclosure of relevant material
from the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal (CFPM). Once disclosure is received, the
Commission will determine the scope of the investigation, identify the individual subjects of
the complaint and notify them. It will then begin to interview witnesses and review materials.
Canada is proud of the honourable work of the men and women in uniform and civilian
officials who served in Afghanistan. Canada remains the leading donor supporting the work
of the AIHRC to strengthen its capacity to fulfill its constitutional mandate to monitor human
rights in Afghanistan. Throughout Canada’s military operations in Afghanistan, the
Government of Canada ensured individuals detained by the CAF were treated humanely and
handled, transferred or released in accordance with our obligations under international law.
Therefore the Government of Canada does not believe an independent judicial commission
of inquiry is necessary.
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Appendix 3
June 17, 2016
Statement by Craig Scott on the Government of Canada’s Response to the Request in EPetition E-70 to Establish a Commission of Inquiry on the Treatment of Afghan Detainees
The government of Prime Minister Trudeau has just responded to e-petition E-70, which calls
for a commission of inquiry into the treatment of Afghan detainees by Canada.
Notwithstanding that the Liberal Party, while in opposition, voted for a motion in the House of
Commons calling for just such a commission of inquiry (a motion which passed), the Liberal
government has now rejected this call.
The text of E-70 and the government response can be found here:
https://petitions.parl.gc.ca/en/Petition/Details?Petition=e-70 (Scroll down page to the section
called “Government response” and click on the embedded PDF link.) The text is also copied
below as an appendix to this statement, for ease of reference.
I thank the government for what appears to be an earnestly long answer (a full three pages).
However, it is full of gaps, elisions, and misdirection. I have already noted a full dozen such
problems, and others with knowledge of this issue will undoubtedly see even more. An analysis
of those problems will come later. For the moment, I will limit myself to an analysis of a truly
shocking blanket claim that ends the government’s response:
“Canada is proud of the honourable work of the men and women in uniform and civilian
officials who served in Afghanistan. Canada remains the leading donor supporting the work of
the AIHRC to strengthen its capacity to fulfill its constitutional mandate to monitor human
rights in Afghanistan. Throughout Canada’s military operations in Afghanistan, the Government
of Canada ensured individuals detained by the CAF were treated humanely and handled,
transferred or released in accordance with our obligations under international law. Therefore
the Government of Canada does not believe an independent judicial commission of inquiry is
necessary.”
These words could have been penned, word for word, by the previous Conservative
government. To the extent they were penned by others and not directly by the Minister signing
off on the response (Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan), the fact is they may well have been written
by some of the same officials and lawyers who ran the Harper-era messaging strategy.
It is deeply disappointing that the Liberal government has chosen to add another link to a chain
of complicity that for over a decade has seen non-stop efforts on the part of various Canadian
government actors to hide the truth and block any form of accountability.
I had expected far more from this government, perhaps mostly because the Hon. Stéphane
Dion is now Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister Dion had been very clear when in
opposition that Canadians still needed to know answers to questions that had still not been
6

answered by the time the Harper government shut down all parliamentary scrutiny after
winning the May 2011 election. I was further encouraged when it was Minister Dion who
announced on May 2 of this year that Canada would finally be ratifying a protocol to the UN
Convention against Torture that allows for international on-site inspection of detention centres
in order to help prevent torture.
Unfortunately, the handling of this E-70 file, alongside the recent Open Letter (attached) calling
for a commission of inquiry, has been driven by the Prime Minister’s Office in coordination with
the Department of Defence. It seems the Minister of Foreign Affairs has been frozen out of the
process. I wish to be clear that it is wholly inappropriate that Minister Sajjan has headed this
decision process, given the possibility he may have relevant general knowledge (and possibly
also specific knowledge) arising from his command and military intelligence roles in Afghanistan
at relevant times. Minister Sajjan should have recused himself from this decision.
It is all the more disappointing the government is rejecting a commission of inquiry given recent
revelations this week (reported in La Presse) from military police officers concerning events in
2010-2011, on top of everything already revealed by journalists and diplomat Richard Colvin
about 2006-2007. This seems to have done nothing to persuade the present government of its
moral responsibility to act differently on this file from the previous Harper Government.
I do not believe Canada can seriously promote human rights and rule of law values, let alone try
to project a “Canada is back” sunny virtue, around the world when we are not prepared to
account for Canadians’ concern about our own complicity in torture, disappearances and extrajudicial killings – by way of our policies and practices of transferring captives to Afghan agencies
known to engage in frequent and/or systematic perpetration of these violations – and our own
alleged direct involvement in abusive treatment of detainees while simultaneously setting up a
system to hide the fact those detainees were in our custody (as just revealed in the La Presse
reports).
And I don’t believe that these practices will not repeat themselves in future simply because a
Defence Minister stands several times in the House of Commons in Question Period and talks
about the great international humanitarian law training the Canadian military receives and also
imparts to others.
It is impossible to be confident that such a future will miraculously emerge when too many
institutions failed to get to the truth about Afghan detainees even as too many other
governmental actors were actively corrupting our democracy through disdain for
accountability, through lies and through deniability mechanisms and cover-ups. Even as the
Defence Minister has stood in the House making such blithe pronouncements, military police
officers are stating their belief that the government – this government – has not been
cooperating with the Military Police Complaints Commission and have set out details to
substantiate their conviction that aspects of Canada’s military culture regressed to replicate
some of the problems that emerged at the time of the Somalia mission. Make no mistake, here
I am talking about the culture within the military hierarchy and not about the brave and
honourable men and women who worked within the policies, practices and direct orders
decided upon by the hierarchy.
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And I am far from alone in these beliefs. For example, alongside over 40 others from diverse
public service backgrounds, from the human rights advocacy community and from the
academy, former Prime Minister Joe Clark had the following to say to the current Prime
Minister in the above-mentioned Open Letter of June 7:
“Mr. Prime Minister, [t]his is unfinished business of the most serious kind: accountability
for alleged serious violations of Canadian and international laws prohibiting
perpetration of, and complicity in, the crime of torture. As a result of the previous
government’s stonewalling, there were no lessons learned, and no accountability. In a
future military deployment, the same practices could reoccur. A public inquiry would
serve to authoritatively investigate and report on the actions of all Canadian officials in
relation to Afghan detainees, and to review the legal and policy framework that
attempted to justify these actions. Based on this review, the Commission would issue
recommendations with a view to ensuring that Canadian officials never again engage in
practices that violate the universal prohibition of torture.”
The entire letter can be found here: http://www.rideauinstitute.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/Afghan_OpenLetter-Jun7-2016_EN.pdf
Despite the decision by the current Liberal government to act as almost a clone of the previous
Conservative government on this issue, I have faith that there will come a day when the truth
does come out. When it does, I very much hope that it will not be too late for that truth to then
be followed by proper accountability.
To that end, I will continue to do everything I can to ensure the full truth come to light, even as
this government has now demonstrated that a culture of complacency is so entrenched that
justice is very unlikely to be secured through Canadian processes alone. This likely means that
it is with the International Criminal Court that I, and others, will now have to concentrate our
efforts (although it remains open for independently minded Liberal MPs on the House of
Commons’ Standing Committees for Foreign Affairs or National Defence to allow this issue to
be placed back on the parliamentary agenda).
Should the Prosecutor of the ICC be exposed to even some of the evidence that would have
come to light if the Trudeau government had called a Commission of Inquiry here, and then
choose to act on that evidence, Canadians – and this government – should be prepared to be
jolted out of a current mix of apathy and complacency when faced squarely with the question
of what justice requires for what was done in our name.
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Appendix 4
Posting of June 10 on why Minister Sajjan should not be deciding
on the establishment of a commission of inquiry
Published by Craig Scott · June 10 at 12:31am ·
On Wednesday, June 8, an Open Letter to PM Trudeau was released that calls for the
establishment of a commission of inquiry to investigate and report on Canada’s policies and
practices concerning the transfer of detainees to Afghan agencies during the war in
Afghanistan. Signatories include the former Prime Minister of Canada Joe Clark, the inaugural
Chair of the Security Intelligence Review Committee Ron Atkey, Ed Broadbent, Stephen Lewis,
Canadian diplomats posted to Afghanistan during the war, the Secretary-General of Amnesty
International Canada, and around 40 leading scholars and representatives of human rights,
foreign policy, and lawyers’ organizations.
You can read the Open Letter here: http://www.rideauinstitute.ca/…/Afghan_OpenLetter-Jun72016…
By Thursday, June 16, the government must respond to e-petition (e-70), which I initiated in
December 2015 in order to require the government to provide a written response to the call for
a commission of inquiry. You can read it here: https://petitions.parl.gc.ca/en/Petition/Details…
What can we expect from the Liberal government? The signs are not good. Indeed, the signs
are that the Liberals may be preparing to go back on their own demand when in opposition for
a commission of inquiry. Not to put too fine a point on it, initial comments suggest they are
willing to continue the complicity of the Canadian government – first under Harper and now
under Trudeau – in ensuring there will be no accounting let alone accountability for what some
of Canada’s most senior military officers, top civil servants, and ministers of the Crown did in
our name.
Right now, the Department of National Defence appears to have appropriated this matter. It is
the tail that is wagging the dog. I say this because Minister Sajjan and his office are the ones
making initial comments on both the Open Letter and, about six weeks ago, also on e-petition
e-70, and the Department of Global Affairs is directing all journalists to DND for comments on
e-70 and on Open Letter.
This is totally inappropriate.
The Minister of Defence was in theatre in a command role at crucial periods when prisoners
were taken and transferred. He may even have had roles liaising on intelligence matters with
some of the Afghan authorities that are implicated in the human rights abuses that an inquiry
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would be looking at. Keep in mind it was the transfer to intelligence authorities at the National
Directorate of Security that has been at the core of the detainee scandal, as it has been
understood to date. But also, when it comes to unrecorded transfers by Canada of captives qua
"persons under control" (PUCs) to Afghan authorities, some of those transfers were to the
Afghan National Police and Minister Sajjan may have had to liaise with them, according to some
biographical accounts. Some accounts have the Afghan police as at least as problematic an
actor in their treatment of received prisoners as NDS.
None of this is to say that Minister Sajjan had anything to do either with transfers or transfer
policy. I do not know if he did or did not. Nor does it deny that he served our country
honourably and bravely. By all accounts, he very much did.
But it is to say that, at the very least, Minister Sajjan could be called to testify at an inquiry
about his knowledge of the practices of Afghan agencies towards persons in their custody and
also about what others (military and civilian) in the command structure should reasonably have
known about the penchant for torture by the NDS and/or extrajudicial killing by the Afghan
National Police. There are other matters on which he could be called as witness such as the
general nature of intelligence sharing between Canada and Afghanistan, battlefield transfers of
prisoners, the role of Defence Intelligence, cooperation with the US and other allies in relation
to both detainees and intelligence, and coordination between the Canadian military and the
Department of Foreign Affairs.
More generally, this detainee file is in no way just a defence matter. It goes to the heart of
Canada's foreign affairs -- and always involved multiple agencies from DND to DFAIT to Justice
to the PMO and the PCO. It also involves how our parliamentary, justice and legal systems do
and do not implement international law. As such, the decision on a commission of inquiry
properly belongs with the Foreign Affairs Minister and the PM -- or Cabinet as a whole on their
advice. In either case, Minister Sajjan should recuse himself from the decision on E-70's and the
Open Letter's calls for a commission of inquiry.
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